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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v* 
JORGE AQUILAR, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 870327-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from a conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1987), in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the trial court properly admitted evidence obtained 
from defendant's van after defendant was properly stopped and 
voluntarily consented to the search. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
1. Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
2. Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 14. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches 
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall 
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or 
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
3. Utah Code Annotated, § 77-7-15 (1982). 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has 
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and 
an explanation of his actions. 
4. Utah Code Annotated, § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1987). 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order or directly 
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by 
this subsection; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Jorge Aquilar, was charged with possession of a 
controlled substance, a third-degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i) (1987), on March 23, 1987 (R. 7). 
On April 22, 1987, defendant moved to dismiss or in the 
alternative, to suppress evidence of the, 383 pounds of marijuana 
found in the defendants van (R. 27). On April 28, 1987, a 
suppression hearing was conducted; defendant's motion was denied 
(R. 39-40). 
On April 29, 1987, there being no motions to continue, 
defendant was tried before a jury and found guilty (R. 73-78). 
On June 5, 1987, defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term 
not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. Execution of 
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the sentence was suspended and defendant placed on court-
supervised probation for two years, subject to defendant serving 
six months in the Utah County Jail, paying a $ 1,000.00 fine and 
$ 250.00 to the Victims Reparation Fund (R. 84-85). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are taken from the pretrial suppression 
hearing. Because appellant has failed to make the trial 
transcript a part of this appeal, it is not known whether 
additional facts surrounding the search and seizure were 
presented at trial or whether the defendant even renewed his 
objection at trial to the seized evidence. 
On March 14, 1987 some time before 8:30 a.m., Trooper Paul 
Mangleson observed defendant walking on the highway with a can of 
gasoline near Nephi, Utah (R. 121). Trooper Mangleson testified 
he approached the defendant, at the rate of four to five m.p.h., 
coming within four to five feet of the defendant, in an effort to 
offer him a ride to his car. The defendant completely avoided 
him (R. 122). Subsequently, Trooper Mangleson positioned himself 
where he could observe all entrances to the three gasoline 
stations in the area. After waiting for 20 minutes Trooper 
Mangleson conferred with another trooper who had witnessed the 
defendant drive off 15 minutes earlier. Thinking the defendants 
behavior peculiar Trooper Mangleson radioed another trooper to 
••take a close look" at defendants van (R. 122-23). 
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The defendant's own testimony denying the account given by 
Trooper Mangleson, proved internally inconsistent.1 Resolving 
the conflicting testimony was not necessary, however, in the 
lower court's determination.2 
Officer Rawlinson heard the transmission to watch for 
defendant's van and almost immediately observed the van 
approaching (R. 132). Officer Rawlinson testified, "There was 
[sic] two other cars in front of the van I estimated their speed 
between 55 and 60 miles an hour. The van was approximately two 
car lengths behind the second vehicle which I thought was too 
close to be traveling at that speed." (R. 132-33). Officer 
Rawlinson decided to follow the vehicle. After catching up to 
defendant's van, Officer Rawlinson observed the defendant weaving 
between the emergency and right driving lane. 
When I first saw the vehicle it was on the white line the 
[line]3 which is in the slow lane emergency lane, line 
marker, the white solid line, he was driving right on top of 
the line I noticed that he would go back into his lane and 
then drift back over almost touching the line drift back 
over into his lane drifted back over on tip of the white 
line, Drifted back into his lane again on the fourt[h] time 
he went back over and was on top of the line. 
1
 Defendant testified he filled the van's gas tank up 
before proceeding, spending $16.00, (R. 109) when stopped 50 
miles later his gauge revealed only a quarter tank of gas. (R. 
138) . 
2
 The lower court found the dispositive facts to be those 
associated with the Officer Rawlinson's stop of the defendant. 
It considered whether Officer Rawlinson had sufficient cause to 
pull defendant over (R. 147), not if Officer Mangleson had 
probable cause to radio a message to watch for the defendant's van. 
3
 The transcript reads, ". . . the vehicle it was on the 
white line the which is in the slow emergency lane,". A word was 
obviously omitted. 
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(R. 133-34). Thinking he was following a drunk driver, Officer 
Rawlinson activated his emergency lights and pulled the van over 
(R. 134). When stopped, defendant was requested to produce his 
driver's licence and vehicle registration. Defendant produced a 
California driver's licence but did not have a registration 
certificate. The van had Illinois license plates (R. 135). 
Officer Rawlinson stated he was confused, "what Mr. Aquilar 
was doing with a California Driver's license [in] a van from 
Illinois in the middle of Utah." (R. 135). Upon further 
inquiry, defendant responded that the vehicle belonged to a 
friend, but he did not know his friend's name (R. 135). 
Although Officer Rawlinson did not think the defendant 
intoxicated, he was still concerned about the defendant's driving 
pattern and inquired if he had been sleeping at the wheel or if 
he was tired. Defendant responded he, "had been driving a long 
ways", and had driven from both Mexico and California (R. 136). 
In addition to defendant's responses, Officer Rawlinson made 
other observations, which taken together, further aroused 
suspicion. "[On] the far door on the van the panel had been 
pulled away and had been put back and had been duct taped over" 
an indication of drug smuggling. The jack and spare were out in 
plain view. A blanket on the seat appeared that it had been 
slept on and the van appeared to be lived in. Furthermore, there 
was jug of gasoline which made the vehicle "wreak of gasoline", 
and to which Officer Rawlinson stated, "would have made me 
nauseous to drive 50 miles with the fumes from the gasoline." 
(R. 134-35). 
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Officer Rawlinson then testified, 
[Because] he was from both Mexico and California with no 
explanation of whose van it was or why he had it I decided 
to check the van through dispatch to see if it was on record 
of being stolen and try to find out just what was going on 
and it was about that time that I invited him back to my 
vehicle before I invited him back I did ask him if we could 
look through the van and he said that we could do that. 
(R. 136). Officer Rawlinson described the procedures before 
letting the defendant sign the consent to search form. 
I held the form up in front of him (indicating) as if this 
were the form it was on the clip board and he was sitting 
right next to me I held it up in front of him and read it 
out loud as we filled in the blanks. As we filled in the 
blanks I read the entire form to him down to the point where 
he signed it. Before he signed it I went back and begin 
[sic] to read the form back to him again all completed. 
When I got part way through he interrupted me and said that 
I understand I know what you mean you want to look through 
the van it is okay, and he said that in English and I knew 
that he understood at that point and I let him sign the 
form. 
(R. 137). Defendant also testified that he in fact understood 
the request to search his van and voluntarily consented to the 
search (R. 105-06). The search of the van revealed approximately 
383 pounds of marijuana concealed in the van (R. 90, 138). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has failed to included tl*e trial transcript as a 
part of the record, consequently, it is impossible to determine 
if an objection to the admission of the evidence was renewed at 
trial, thus preserving the issue on appeal. Because defendant 
has not established that the issue is properly preserved, this 
Court may summarily dismiss the issue. 
The search and seizure of the defendant in the present case 
directly follows standards established by Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-
6 
(15) (1 982), and Adams v. Williams . • ) and State 
v, Whittenback *•?* ~ ^ ^"l 'r*-*v * Nc officer based his 
stop of the defendant objective facts supporting a reasonable 
s u s p i (i i o i it c " i v i t;; > o b s e rv i i i g t ./ :: 11: a f f I c \ i o 1 a 1: i o n s ; 
and searched defendant's vehicle onlj after the defendant 
voluntarily and unambiguously consented to the search. 
Because defendant voluntarily consented tc tl le search by 
signing a consent to search form, the evidence obtained should be 
admissible even if no probable cause had existed. 
Since the defendant does not argue that an analysis of the 
issues would have different outcome under the state 
c o n s t i t u t i o i i t: h i s C"" c ' s h o u 11 d f o c \ i s e x c 1 u s i v e 1 } D I i 11 I e federal 
constitution. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HE PRESERVED HIS 
OBJECTION AT TRIAL TO THE ADMISSION OF THE SEIZED EVIDENCE 
SO AS TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE FOR APPELLATE REVIEW. 
Appellant has failed to make the trial transcript a par t of 
this appeal, consequently, it is impossible to known whether an 
objection to the seized evidence was renewed during the trial. 
Ar i appeal, appellant carries the burden of establishing that the 
objection was renewed. State v. Holyoak, 74 3 p.2d 791, 7 92 (Utah 
App. 1987), State v. Johnson. No, 20814, slip op, at 10 (Utah 
Dec. 31, 1987) (Justice Durham concurring joined by Justices Howe 
and Zimmerman) lolyoak, MT1 i.e I Jt .ah Sup- ti emc rt 
has held that "a specific objection [at t ^ tequired even 
where a pretrial motion t suppress has been made,*" Holyoak at 
792 , quoting State v. Lesley, 6 72 I > 2d 79 , 82 ( I J1 a) i 1983) . 
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Holyoak further held, that the motion must be renewed at trial, 
even when the same judge who presided over the trial heard the 
motion to suppress. Holyoak at 792; See. Johnson at 10. 
Because defendant has not included the trial transcript as a 
part of the record and has not shown that the issue is properly 
preserved for appellate review the issue on appeal may be 
summarily dismissed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM 
DEFENDANT'S VAN AFTER DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY STOPPED AND 
VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH. 
The guarantees of the Fourth Amendment are intended to 
protect citizens not from all searches and seizures but rather 
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 9 (1968). In judging the reasonableness of a particular 
search and seizure, it has become well established that a court 
"will not disturb the ruling of the trial court on the 
admissibility of evidence unless it clearly appears that the 
lower court was in error." State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 
(Utah 1985); See, State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1983); 
State v. Gray, 717 P.2d 1313, 1316 (Utah 1986). 
A review of the present case calls for consideration of i) 
whether Officer Rawlinson was justified in pulling the defendant 
over after observing two separate and independent traffic 
violations, and ii) whether the defendant's consent to the search 
was properly obtained. 
8 
STOPPING THE DEFENDANT 
off JPPT - - f • " tr hearing the radio 
transmission *** natching +*« defendant's, he 
obse tne uefendant following within two car lengths of 
another car while travel > (R. 132-
3 3 ) . ' Thinking this distance unsafe, the officer made a U-turn 
through the median and began to follow the defendant. When the 
van was in sight, the offi cer it- tilled that In unserved the 
defendant weaving between the emergency lane and right driving 
1 ar ie( crossii ig at least four times, leading him to 
believe the defendant may be driving while- intox icaLc-d (R. 133-
I Jtal :t Co - 7 7-7 15 (108.M states, 
ft peace officer may stop any person in a public place when 
he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or 
is in the act of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
Officer Rawlinson's observations clearly supported a reasonable 
suspicion that the defendant may have been in violation of Utah 
Code Ann § 41-6-44 ( 1 "Uf /) , di J v i F \ wh i I P inf ox i eated, thus 
making his stop of the defendant reasonable. 
The 1,'lah Supreme court in State v. Whittenback. 621 P. 2d 103 
(Utah 1980), has stated: 
When a police officer sees or hears conduct which gives rise 
to suspicion of crime, he has not only the right but the 
duty to make observations and investigations to determine 
whether the law is being violated; and i f so, to take 
measures as are necessary i n the enforcement of tt ne law. 
State Whittenback at 105, quoting State v. Folkes. 565 P.2d 
1125 (Utah -9771. "Though theie. may hr mo probable cause to make 
9 
an arrest, a officer may, in appropriate circumstances and in an 
appropriate manner, approach a person for investigating possible 
criminal activity. Id. at 105. An analysis of Officer 
Rawlinson's actions in light of Whittenback suggest not only that 
his actions were reasonable, but that a failure to investigate 
defendant's behavior may have constituted neglect on the part of 
the officer. 
The United States Supreme Court has similarly held that 
probable cause sufficient for arrest is not nec€>ssary in order 
for an officer to make an investigatory stop. Adams v. Williams, 
407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972). 
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who lacks 
the precise level of information necessary for probable 
cause to arrest to simply shrug his should€>rs and allow a 
crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary, 
Terry recognizes that it may be the essence of good police 
work to adopt an intermediate response. A brief stop of a 
suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or 
to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more 
information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts 
known to the officer at the time. 
Adams at 145, 146. 
Taken together, Utah statutory law and the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court, and the Utah Supreme Court in Adams 
and Whittenback, clearly support the actions of Officer Rawlinson 
as eminently reasonable. Further, even if an improper motive 
could have been imputed to Officer Rawlinson's stopping the 
defendant, the court in United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 
708-09 (11th Cir. 1986), stated that an improper motive alone 
will not invalidate an objectively reasonable stop, for instance, 
a stop based upon the probable cause of an observed traffic 
violation. 
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State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985) and State v. 
Truiillo, 60 Utah Aih ii'-pf l.t» |Unu), upon which defendant 
relies, are clearly distinguishable fr om the facts of this case. 
In Tru ;i 11lo the officer based his stop and subsequent search 
c- defendant on vague and unspecific factors.4 The court 
specifically noted that the officer did not witness the defendant 
"violate any t rat f ic o inres oi fMiiq.iqe in any cr iminal 
behavior ,f Truiillo at 52. The reasonableness of the subsequent 
search was therefore suspect. In the present case, the stop was 
t a s e cl o n o b j e c t i v e £ a c t s v* I \ i i • \ l '1 c? 11 1 1 i <= • o f f i z e i: t :> suspect 
criminal activity.5 Additionally, the search was conducted only 
after the defendant voluntarily signed a consent to search form. 
. Truiillo •** . - • ; * - ! - . fficer, 
"took hold of Trujillo, told him, to place hi s hands on the patrol 
car and spread his feet, and patted down the outer surfaces of 
Tru j i11of s c1oth i ng." Truiillo at 52. 
Likewise, * Swanigan, defendant's wer e stopped and 
subsequently searched iny ub |cjct j w farts support Inq a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Swanigan at 718-19. 
4
 11 ie factors offered by the officer were I) it was a high-
crime area, ii) the lateness of the hour, iii) the apparent 
nervous conduct of the trio (including defendant) , and iv) the 
"suspicious nylon knapsack" defendant carried. 
5
 Officer Rawlinson stated he observed the defendant 
following too closely to the vehicle while traveling about 55-60 
m.p.h. and weaving between the emergency and right lane at least 
four times. The officer suspected the defendant was driving 
while intoxicated and for that reason activated his lights and 
pulled the defendant over. (R 132-34). 
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Defendant's argument that the stop by the second officer, 
after observing two traffic violations should be invalidated, 
because the first officer lacked objective facts supporting a 
reasonable suspicion when he called ahead, is without merit• As 
the trial court correctly determined, objective facts supporting 
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity were present when 
Officer Rawlinson pulled the defendant over (R. 144-147). 
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH 
It is "well settled that one of the specifically established 
exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable 
cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent." 
Schneckloth v Bustomonte. 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Whittenback. expounded on the 
requirements of a search conducted pursuant to consent. The 
court stated that although the prosecution has the burden of 
establishing from the totality of* the circumstances that the 
consent was voluntarily given, it is not required to prove that 
the defendant knew of his right to refuse to consent in order to 
show voluntariness. Whittenback, 621 P. 2d at 105. In 
Whittenback, defendants conceded that the search was made 
pursuant to consent, but claimed that the consent was not 
voluntarily given. In response, the court analyzed five factors 
which guide the determination of voluntariness showing a lack of 
duress or coercion. 
Factors which may show a lack of duress or coercion include: 
1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the 
officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the 
officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4)cooperation by the 
owner of the vehicle; and 5; the absence of deception or 
12 
trick on the part of the officer. In the instant case, when 
Officer Geslison asked defendants for permission to search 
the automobile, all he had done was ask them for their 
identification and ask preliminary questions. Defendants 
were not in custody at the time, and although Officers Mock 
and Leatham arrived before consent was given, Mock did not 
enter the laundromat and Leatham entered just as consent was 
being given, thus, the presence of additional officers did 
not create an undue show of authority When Officer 
Geslison requested permission to search, he did not claim 
any authority to search or deceive defendants into thinking 
he had a search warrant. He simply asked if he could search 
the automobile, to which Parrett responded "Yes," or "Yes, 
you can go ahead and search it." Finally, none of the 
officers used force 01 : threats of force to obtain the 
consent. Under the totality of circumstances test, the 
state met its burden of proving that the consent to search 
the automobile was voluntarily given. 
Whittenback footnotes omitted) 
The facts . ^resent case are remarkably similar, if not 
more favorable * those described in Whittenback. Before asking 
t c ! s e a i c I i 1: - e f e n d a n t w a s :i it o t i i i c u s t o d > a i i d h a d been 
asked only preliminary questions. Only two officers were present 
when the search was conducted and the record indicates that the 
s e c o n d o f £ i c e r a r r i " / e d o i 11 > s t 1 o i: 11 y b e £ c r e , a i i d e v c= i i perhaps 
after, the consent form was signed (R. 137). Officer Rawlinson 
was clear and explicit in explaining the consent form and made no 
claim of authority or attempt tc deceive the defendant. The 
officer , 1 ike the officer ii i Whittenback, simply inquired if he 
could search the vehicle and he received an affirmative response 
The present case different from Whittenback in that the 
present defendant dot ,-, , : cli 11 lem|<» the voluntary nature of his 
consent. Instead, defendant readily acknowledges that he gave 
consent and that •- .- >luntary (R. 105-06, 137). Clearly, 
undei the riici -' - isent shoulil be consider ed valid 
13 
and the evidence thereby obtained not violative the of the 
defendant's constitutional rights. 
Even if there were no probable cause to stop the defendant, 
the voluntary consent given by the defendant would compel the 
admission of the evidence. In United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 
1141 (10th Cir. 1986), the government's request for defendant's 
consent to search was motivated by illegally obtained 
information, but the police did not use the fruits of the primary 
illegality to coerce the defendant into giving his consent. The 
Tenth Circuit found that where the defendant's subsequent consent 
to search was voluntarily given, free of police exploitation of 
the primary illegality and by means sufficiently distinguishable 
to purge the taint of the prior illegality, the seized evidence 
was admissible. Id. at 1147-51. In State v. Angel, 356 So. 2d 
986 (La. 1978), the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated that "a 
voluntary consent to search, given after illegal detention, is 
valid under circumstances which show no exploitation of the 
illegality." Angel at 989. The court further said, "there 
should be no distinction between a legal arrest and an illegal 
one, because "it is the voluntariness of consent which is 
decisive." Angel at 989 (emphasis in original). 
In the present case there can be no question but that the 
defendant gave his voluntary consent allowing his van to be 
searched. The record never intimates or suggests otherwise. The 
evidence obtained through the search should, therefore, be 
admissible. 
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III. BECAUSE DEFENDANT LIMITS HIS ARGUMENTS TO THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION AND FAILS TO BRIEF THE ISSUES UNDER UTAH'S 
CONSTITUTION THE COURT'S ANALYSIS SHOULD FOCUS EXCLUSIVELY 
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. 
The Utah Supreme Court through - series of opinions has 
indicated that arguments for different analysis under the state 
and f fj,diM".! i i "urist 1 f u I i mi should be considei nl i! rade. State v. 
Earl, 716 P,2d 80) 805-06 (Utah 1986), State v. Hygh, 711 P 2d 
264, 271-71 (Utah 1985), State v. Laffertv, No. 20740, slip op. 
a I:: 1 ] n l > (U t a h J a n 1 ] ] 9 8 8) I n Laffertv, 11 :i e c o \ 11: t a f f i rm e d 
its position that if defendant does not argue that the analysis 
of the issues under the Utah Constitution would be different from 
i t s ana1 > sIs u nde i t h e f ederal constitution, no state 
constitutional analysis is necessary. Lafferty at 11. 
Defendant i n t h e case at bar cites t h e IJ t a h C o n s t i t u t: i c > n, 
but does not argue for a separate state constitutional analysis 
and the Court should, therefore, consider only his federal claim. 
State v. Egbert, Mi id an A<r kepi '>, , 'i 1 in „ ) |„ 1987 JI
 (l State v. 
Hackford. 737 P.2d 200, 205 n.3 (Utah 1987), State v. Dorsev. 731 
P.2d 1085, 1091 n.l (Utah 1986), Lafferty at 14. 
CONCLUSION 
HdM1 I nun M M Ihieqninq rt i quiiii nl . , time M dt P respectfully 
requests this Court to affirm defendant's conviction. 
Dated this / ^ T day of February, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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